This paper analyzes economic policies in resource rich countries and various mechanisms of resource curse leading to a potentially inefficient use of resources. Arguments are provided in favor of "conditional resource curse" hypothesis: resource abundance hampers growth if institutions of a country are weak. We study the impact of the resource abundance on budget deficit and inflation, foreign exchange reserves and real exchange rate, as well as policies of maintaining low domestic fuel and energy prices. We show that lower domestic fuel prices, that are typical for resource rich countries, have a positive effect on investment in R&D and fixed capital stock, and on long term growth, even though they are associated with losses resulting from higher energy intensity. However, in resource rich countries real exchange rate is generally higher than in other countries. Besides, resource abundance leads to corruption of institutions, especially if these institutions were not strong in the beginning of the period. While there is no solid evidence that, on average, resource abundant countries grow more slowly than the others, there is evidence that they use resources less efficiently, if their institutions are weak. В статье изучаются особенности экономической политики стран, богатых ресурсами, описаны основные механизмы, порождающие неэффективное использование сосредоточенных ресурсов. Приводятся аргументы в пользу гипотезы « условного проклятия»: ресурсное изобилие замедляет рост, если в стране слабые институты. Рассматривается влияние ресурсного богатства на макроэкономические индикаторы -дефицит бюджета, темп инфляции, накопление золотовалютных резервов, реальный валютный курс. Исследуется политика занижения внутренних цен на топливо. Показано, что, хотя такая политика увеличивает энергоемкость, она может способствовать ускорению роста. В странах, богатых ресурсами, реальный валютный курс при прочих равных условиях выше, чем у других стран. Кроме того, при плохих институтах ресурсное изобилие ведет к еще большему их ухудшению. Хотя нет оснований считать, что богатые ресурсами страны «в среднем» растут медленнее других, имеются свидетельства того, что при слабых институтах увеличение объема сосредоточенных ресурсов в стране сопровождается снижением эффективности их использования.
Introduction
It seems obvious that a country endowed with larger quantities of natural resources has an advantage and (other conditions being similar) has to grow faster than resource poor countries. This is not exactly the case, however. Between 1960 and 1990 the per capita incomes of resource poor countries grew two to three times faster than the per capita income of resource abundant countries, and the gap in the growth rates appears to widen with time (Sachs and Warner (1999) , ). This surprising phenomenon became a subject of intensive research, both empirical and theoretical. Hundreds of papers were published in recent years supporting the "resource curse" thesis and offering different explanations of mechanisms and effects that may inhibit growth in resource rich economies. Several recent papers, however (Alexeev, Conrad, 2005; Stijns, 2005; Brunnschweiler, 2006) , question the mere existence of the "resource curse" and make it necessary to reconsider the hypotheses about the impact of resource abundance on economic growth.
Even without rigorous calculations, it is obvious that not all resource rich countries failed.
"Thirty years ago, Indonesia and Nigeria -both dependent on oil -had comparable per capita incomes. Today, Indonesia's per capita income is four times that of Nigeria. A similar patter holds true in Sierra Leone and Botswana. Both are rich in diamonds. Yet Botswana averaged 8.7% annual economic growth over the past thirty years, while Sierra Leone plunged into civil strife." (Stiglitz (2004) ). Norway, where large oil deposits were detected in the seventies, was able to avoid Dutch Disease consequences (Gylfason (2001) ). Moreover, Norway increased its PPP GDP per capita very significantly, leaving behind its neighbors, and almost catching up with USA. This paper is a summary of a more extensive research 1 that compares various theories of "resource curse" with a special focus on models allowing for the varying -positive or negativeimpact of resources on development depending on the quality of institutions and economic policies. Several mechanisms leading to a potentially inefficient use of resources are being examined; it is demonstrated that each of these mechanism is associated with market imperfections and can be "corrected" with appropriate government policies.
There is no solid evidence that resource abundance, unlike physical and human capital, have a significant impact, either positive or negative, on economic growth. The inclusion of different measures of resource wealth, production and exports into the growth regressions does not produce any stable results, especially after controlling for the population density, initial level of income, population growth rates and the initial quality of institutions 2 .
Our empirical investigation presented below shows that resource abundant countries have on average:
-lower budget deficits and inflation, higher foreign exchange reserves and higher inflows of FDI;
-lower domestic fuel prices => positive effect on long term growth even though they are associated with losses resulting from higher energy intensity; -higher investment/GDP ratio;
-lower income inequality.
However, resource abundance -leads to higher RER (Dutch disease), distortions of domestic prices, and high energy intensity; 1 Полтерович, В., В. Попов, А. Тонис (2007а) . This paper, written in Russian, describes results of our projects in greater detail. The main results of our project were published also in : Полтерович, Попов, Тонис (2007b) . 2 Only the indicator of sub-soil assets affects growth significantly and positively in growth regressions after controlling for:
-Y75 -PPP GDP per capita in 1975, % of the US level, -PopDens -density of the population (persons per 1 square km), -n -average annual population growth rates in 1975-99, %, -ICres -residual index of investment climate (residual from the regression of investment climate on Y75). y = -0.03 Y75*** + 0. 016*PopDens + -1.01***n + 0. 10***ICres + 0.012**SSA + 4.02, N= 63, R-squared = 0.4892
Neither of other indicators of the resource wealth (EXfuel, Imfuel, Prodf, ResOG) is significant in growth regressions (see the list of notations below).
If we control only for initial income, population density, population size, and population growth rates, but not for the quality of institutions, then generally resource wealth, fuel exports, and resource rent has a negative impact on growth, whereas the impact of the production of fuel is insignificant.
-weakens institutions, if they were poor to begin with, does not contribute to the accumulation of human capital; -hampers economic growth under low institutional quality, but accelerates growth of economies with high quality of institutions.
Thus, there seem to be two main mechanisms of the conditional resource curse: institutional worsening and Dutch disease. Appropriate industrial policy (or the lack of it) may be the third mechanism that has a major impact on growth in resource rich countries.
For a country that tries to avoid the overvaluation of the currency as a result of a resource boom, there seem to be two extreme policy responses. In the first case, a country keeps the real exchange rate of its currency low enough by accumulating assets abroad (foreign exchange reserves) and getting low but reliable interest income. This used to be the policy of Norway and a number of other countries. To an extent, this seems to be the current policy of the Russia, which accumulated large foreign exchange reserves (nearly $500 billion by the beginning of 2008), although this accumulation was not enough to prevent the real appreciation of the ruble.
The second type of policy implies the reallocation of the income flows to stimulate development of manufacturing and machine-building sectors.
The first policy is secure, but it seems to miss a window of opportunity for a developing country. The second policy could give a chance to diversify national economy, so it is less dependent on the world resource prices. This policy is risky since it requires good administration and good coordination of government and business efforts. Besides, a range of mixed policies may be considered. One can try to find an optimal mixture of reserve accumulation and industrial policy redistribution. A compromise between inflation and overvaluation of domestic currency is a part of this problem.
In what follows we run cross country regressions that do not deal with endogeneity problem.
Hence, our results have to be considered as preliminary ones, and our conclusions have to be checked using panel data.
Review of the literature
Several explanations for the "resource curse" have been offered in the literature. The first explanation, suggested by R. Prebish (1950) and H. Singer (1950) , is known as Prebish -Singer hypothesis. They pointed to a tendency for primary goods prices to decline relatively to prices of manufactured goods, and suggested that the share of primary goods in GDP will diminish due to technical progress. Therefore countries relying on primary goods sector have to grow slower than economies relying on manufacturing industries. Prebish and his followers ("structuralists") recommended that developing countries temporary close their economies to fully develop manufacturing industries.
There are two major objections to Prebish-Singer (PS) hypothesis, however. First, a number of recent studies used modern econometrics technique to demonstrate that PS-hypothesis holds not for all primary goods and not for all periods (Kelard, Wohar (2002) ). Second, few, if any, attempts to follow Prebish advice proved to be successful.
An earlier export based theory of resource-driven growth was suggested by Innis (1954) , Baldwin (1956) and Hirshman (1977) (see also Auti, Kiiski (2001) ). Innis developed a "staple theory of economic development" argueing that countries, in particular Canada, had grown and developed into an integrated economy through exports of primary products. Other scholars studied economic histories of a number of developed and developing countries and demonstrated that primary resource sector influenced positively or negatively their economic growth dependently on its linkages with other sectors. These linkages are defined by technologies of the resource extraction. In some cases development of resource sector stimulates to the rise of industries that supply its inputs (backward linkage) and that process the staple products prior to export (forward linkage). Due to these and other linkages an economy gradually diversifies.
However, the diversification does not take place if the linkages are weak (when, for example, inputs are supplied from abroad). In this case production concentrates in the resource sector that has little contact with the rest of the economy. The country falls into a staple trap.
Historical studies of many resource abundant countries show that the Staple Trap Theory, being useful, has a limited explanatory power since it does not take into account the role of macroeconomic and political economy variables (Findlay, Lundahl (2001) , Abidin (2001) Gylfason (2001)).
The famous "Dutch Disease" story is another possible mechanism of resource curse. Assume a resource boom, a sudden windfall gain. This may be associated with temporary increase in the price of oil or natural resource discoveries. Resource boom seems to open a window of opportunity for a developing country, a possibility to start a catching up process. However, market forces do not lead an economy in the right direction. The resource boom causes a currency appreciation, an increase in import and a rise in wages and in relative prices of nontradables. Capital accumulation decreases. New opportunities divert capital from manufacturing and machine-building sectors. If there are learning by doing effects or positive externalities from human capital accumulation in these sectors and not in the resource extraction sector, then resource boom may have negative effect on long run economic growth (Corden, Neary (1982) , Krugman (1987) , Matsuyama (1992) , Auty (2001, Ch. 7) ). This phenomenon is known as Dutch Disease since it was clearly observed in the Netherlands in the 1960-80s, after the giant Groningen gas field was discovered in 1959.
Another example of market failure explanation is the "overshooting model". Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) argued that resource abundant economies tend to have higher, not lower levels of GDP per capita with respect to resource poor countries. They introduce a factor of production which (like oil) expands more slowly that labor and capital into a Ramsey model and show that the economy demonstrates overshooting effect. The economy surpasses its steady state level of income in finite time and then comes back to its steady state, displaying negative rate of growth.
Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, authors show that Venezuelan negative growth path in 1972-1993 may be explained by their theory.
A shortcoming of the Rodriguez-Sachs approach, however, is that it does not explain why the steady state is not moving fast enough to catch up with developed economies. One can try to construct an endogenous growth model to take into account technical progress as well as institutions and to continue this line of research.
The Dutch Disease theory explains macroeconomic consequences of a resource boom, whereas the Rodriguez-Sachs approach implies that the economy is not able to adjust in an optimal way to the shock of discovery of resource deposits. Market failure is actually at the heart of both explanations. A question arises, however, if a government is able to correct it.
Another strand of the modern literature emphasizes government failure story -political economy aspects of a resource boom. Revenues from resources increase so drastically that investments into rent seeking to capture the resource control turn out to be much more profitable than investments into production. Lobbing, dishonest competition, corruption flourish hampering economic growth (Auty (1997) , Sachs and Warner (1999a, b) , Bulte at al. (2003) ). This is why so many attempts to use resource sector profit for industrial policy projects were unsuccessful.
Governments taxed primary resource producers and invested the money into new industries.
However, the projects failed due to bad investment climate. Instead human capital deteriorated and inequality increased hampering economic growth (Leamer at al (1998) ). Low quality of institutions is analyzed in Leamer et al (1998) , Sala-i-Martin, Subramanian (2003 ) Gylfason (2004 , Stijns (2005) , whereas Gylfason (2001) , Suslova, Volchkova (2006) provide explanations and evidence of deterioration of human capital in resource rich countries. Our own hypothesis examined later in this paper is that resource orientation stimulates corruption in countries with poor initial quality of institutions, but not in countries with strong institutions.
Non-linearity in this relationship is also found by Mehlum, Moene, Torvik (2005) , Robinson, Torvik, Verdier (2006 ), Chystyakov (2006 . The latter paper provides a modification of (Leite, Weidmann, 1999) .
We consider three channels of "resource curse":
• Macroeconomic: poor management of resource rent (budget deficits, inflation).
• Institutional:
-Struggle for resource rent -Instability of democracy
• «Technological" -inability to reap externalities from the development of non-resource industries due to poor industrial policies Obviously, there is a fundamental contradiction here: market failure requires government intervention, but low institutional quality results in government failure.
Data
We use the general economic statistics from the World Development Indicators (WDI) -this gives us data on growth rates, inflation, budget deficits, reserve accumulation, price levels, -all available from 1996; they vary from -2.5 to +2.5, the higher, the better). We also use the investment climate index, available since 1984 from the International Country Risk Guide (it varies from 0 to 100, the higher the better investment climate; IC-average investment climate index in 1984-90, and IC2000 -same for 2000).
Proven reserves and production of hydrocarbons are taken from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2006
3 , whereas data on sub-soil assets 4 are from Kunte et al (1998) . Overall we consider five main indicators of resource abundance:
• EXfuel -share of fuel in exports in 1960-99, %.
• Imfuel -average ratio of net import of fuel to total import in 1960-99, %
• Prodf-production of oil and gas per capita in 1980-1999, tons of oil equivalent.
• ResOG -proven reserves of oil and gas per capita in 1980-1999, tons of oil equivalent.
• SSA -sub-soil assets per capita in $ US in 1994 [Kunte et al., 1998 ].
The correlation coefficients between these indicators are shown in table 1. All of them are significant at 1% level. Even though the number of countries for which data on all 5 indicators are available is only 26, the coefficients and significance do not change much, when correlation is computed between any 2 indicators from the list of 5 for a larger group of countries. It should be noted that correlation between reserves and production is quite high, whereas the correlation between exports (net or total), on the one hand, and production and reserves per capita, on the other hand, is noticeably lower. This is explained by different energy per capita consumption in countries at different stages of development -rich countries consume several times more energy per person than developing countries. For instance, at current average annual level of energy consumption of Western countries (about 5 tons of oil equivalent per capita, and even 8 tons in US and Canada) some well known fuel exporters, like Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Mexico, Russia, would not be exporters because their fuel production would be just enough to cover domestic consumption ( Fig. 1 ).
In subsequent regressions we include only countries that produce fuel (69 countries), have reserves of fuel (57), and export fuel (181); other countries are not included into regressions.
A complete description of notations used in the paper is given in Appendix. 
Macroeconomic policy in resource rich countries
A priori, it is not clear how resource abundance influences macroeconomic indicators. On the one hand, high export revenues facilitate the maintenance of low inflation and high investment. On the other hand, a temptation arises to borrow and to spend too much, so that unfavorable change of world prices or other conditions may result in a crisis. Below we investigate which of two tendencies dominates on balance.
Inflation and budget surplus
It turns out that higher per capita fuel production is associated with lower inflation 5 : So, resource abundance actually helps to balance the budget and to stabilize prices. This conclusion, of course, is true only in the "average case". Countries like Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE had very low inflation (some -Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabiaeven experienced deflation in 1984-91), whereas Angola, Bolivia, Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela experienced periods of high inflation.
Domestic investment
One has to expect that resource rent increases savings that under reasonably good institutions could be transformed into higher investment. In linear regressions resource abundance affects the share of investment in GDP positively. But the threshold regression works better: Inv = -0. 1307258***Y75 + 1.177838***Prodf -0. 0139361 **Prodf · IC + 0.2737717 *** IC + 11.84***, R-squared = 0. 25, N = 44.
Rewriting this last equation it in the form that makes the threshold on institutions explicit, we get:
This means that in countries with very good investment climate (IC > 84,5, level of Canada, Finland, New Zealand, UK), increase in fuel production does not lead to higher share of investment in GDP, but in all other countries it actually does, and the effect is stronger in countries with bad investment climate. .
Similar results were obtained for the other measures of resource abundance -export of fuel, resource rent and sub-soil assets. Only the proven reserves turn out to be insignificant for explaining the share of investment in GDP.
Foreign direct investment
The relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and resource export and production turns out to be positive -FDI is higher in fuel producing and exporting countries. Controlling for initial per capita income, Y75, and population density, Popdens, we obtain that FDI, net annual average inflow of foreign direct investment as a % of GDP in 1980-99, is positively linked to export and production of fuel: It was shown above that EXfuel positively influences budget surplus; therefore a government has more possibilities to decrease income inequality.
The result also holds if one excludes DEM from the regression as well as for a number of other modifications of the regression model.
Note that our result contradicts the conclusions of another study (Gylfason, T. G., Zoega, 2002) claiming that resource abundance is the factor that contributes to inequalities. But this study used another indicator of resource abundance (the share of natural resources in total wealth of the country).
Institutions
If resource rich countries have a number of advantages -responsible macroeconomic policies (low budget deficits and inflation), higher level of domestic and foreign investment, higher life expectancy (regressions not shown here) and lower income inequalities, why these advantages cannot be transformed into higher growth? Why not a single major exporter of fuel had become a case of "growth miracle", showing growth rates comparable to that of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in the 1950s-1980s? As a matter of fact, out of major fuel exporters only Indonesia experienced high growth rates in 1967-97 (per capita GDP grew at an annual average rate of 3,9%, whereas annual population growth rate was about 2%, so that annual average growth of GDP was about 6% for three decades. The hypothesis that we are trying to test below is that there are two major hurdles for the rapid growth of resource rich countries -poor quality of state institutions and inadequate industrial policy (maintenance of low domestic fuel prices and high real exchange rate, as the Dutch disease theory predicts).
Does resource abundance influence the quality of institutions? Some authors (Alexeev, Conrad, 2005) claim that there is no link, whereas others (Kartashov, 2006; Chystyakov, 2006) find a more subtle non-linear relationship -no impact of resources on institutions for rich countries with good institutions (or even a positive impact) and a negative impact for countries with bad institutions. Possible mechanisms of such an impact were discussed in the literature more than once. First, resource abundance creates stimuli to fight for resource rent -this struggle becomes possible under weak institutions and, as a result, weakens them even more. Second, the outflow of resources from secondary manufacturing and high tech industries into resource sector inhibits the growth of human capital, which in turn poses obstacles for the perfection of institutions. Third, high budget revenues from resource sector make governments less willing to invest into the creation of strong institutions.
The best result we were able to get is the following threshold relationship: Rewriting this equation in the form, making the institutional threshold explicit, we get:
So, if IС < 54,8 (level of Algeria, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Kenya, Qatar, UAE), export of fuel has a negative impact on the subsequent quality of institutions.
If we control for per capita GDP, the impact of resource exports and production on other indicators of the quality of institutions (GE, RL,CC, CPI) is negative, but no thresholds could be found. The impact of deposits (reserves) is insignificant (significant only for СС -control over corruption index).
It should be noted that some resource rich countries have relatively high indicators of the quality of institutions. For instance, in Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, not to speak about
Norway, the quality of institutions is comparable to that of Italy. The worst institutional indicators are observed in Angola, Iraq, and Nigeria.
With regards to human capital, it turns out that with weak institutions and high production of fuel there are not so many chances to improve educational levels. As the following regression 
Industrial policy
The most important features of industrial policy in resource abundant countries are the maintenance of the low domestic energy and fuel prices (via export taxes and direct restrictions on export) and the overvaluation of the exchange rate. The latter -overvalued exchange rate -is not usually considered as an instrument of industrial policy, but in fact it is exactly that. As shown in (Polterovich, Popov, 2004) , the levels and rates of growth of foreign exchange reserves (FOREX) vary greatly among countries, even after controlling for the objective factors of accumulation of reserves, such as the ratio of trade to GDP, the volatility of trade, the quality of institutions, the GDP per capita, level of external debt 6 . These differences in the speed of reserve accumulation -the policy induced rate of accumulation of reserves -turned out to be very informative for the explanation of cross-country variations in growth rates: whereas for the developed countries the accumulation of reserves in excess of objective needs was detrimental 6 We tried to regress the increase of foreign exchange reserves to GDP ratios on other factors, including capital flows, government debt, short term capital flows, but they proved to be insignificant, see (Polterovich, Popov, 2004) .
for growth, for developing countries, this accumulation had a strong positive impact on growth even after controlling for the usual variables in growth regressions, such as initial income, the quality of the institutions, population growth rates, investment/GDP ratios.
Real exchange rate (RER) is usually considered as an exogenous variable (in the long term), but the fact is that differences among countries in the rates of accumulation of reserves lead to dramatic variations in the level real exchange rates, even after controlling for the GDP per capita (to capture the Balassa-Samuelson effect). The policy of undervaluation of real exchange rate via accumulation of foreign exchange reserves thus results in disequilibrium (underpriced) exchange rate -this effect is quite large and is sometimes called "exchange rate protectionism" 7 . The reason that such a policy spurs growth is at least twofold. First, it allows reaping externalities from exports, especially manufacturing and high-tech exports, providing extra protection to the domestic producers of all tradable goods, increasing their competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign producers, and reorienting them towards export markets. For developed countries export to GDP ratios may be already at the optimal level, whereas for the developing countries they are still low, so special government efforts are needed to raise them to optimum. Second, rapid accumulation of reserves provides a signal to the foreign investors (that the government is strong) and also underprices domestic assets, so that there is an additional inflow of foreign direct investment that contributes to growth. In Polterovich, Popov (2004) and Polterovich, Popov (2006, а,b) we offer a model that demonstrates how these effects work and provide empirical evidence that countries that accumulate excess reserves have lower real exchange rates, higher growth of export and trade to GDP ratios, higher investment to GDP ratios and eventually grow faster. Rodrik (2007) provides evidence that countries with undervalued exchange rates do indeed grow faster.
Theoretically, the same effect can be reached via imposition of import duties and export subsidies (that was a policy of a number of fast growing countries, especially in East Asia), but the advantage of undervaluation of the exchange rate via reserves accumulation is that this latter policy is not selective and hence can be effective even with poor institutions and poor quality of bureaucracy. As argued in Polterovich, Popov (2006, а,b) , there is empirical evidence that the effectiveness of import tariffs depends on the quality of institutions, whereas the "exchange rate protectionism" works in all poor countries, even with poor institutional capacity. Irrespective of the existence of the long term impact of undervaluation of real exchange rate on growth, most economists would agree that the exchange rate should be at least not overvalued, like it often happens in resource exporting countries (Dutch disease). Below we provide evidence that resource abundant countries really have higher real exchange rates and this has a predictable negative effect on growth. However, at the same time these countries usually keep relatively low domestic prices for fuel and energy that has two effects on growth: negative (due to higher energy intensity, resulting in energy waste) and positive (due to the higher competitiveness of domestic producers enjoying low energy costs), and the second, stimulating, effect predominates.
The best policy, thus, is to underprice the exchange rate and to keep domestic fuel prices high, but normally resource abundant countries have the opposite combination.
Accumulation of FOREX and the level of RER
The data suggest that fuel exporting countries have more FOREX in months of import than the other countries: However, the accumulation of reserves in resource abundant countries proceeded more slowly than in other economies, even though to avoid the "Dutch disease" they had to accumulate reserves faster: 
Low domestic fuel prices
Whereas resource rich countries have generally overvalued exchange rate ("Dutch disease"), they also maintain a relatively low level of domestic prices for fuel. This is another important instrument of industrial policy that has at least two implications: first, the, like the undervaluation of the RER, low domestic prices for fuel provide competitive advantages to domestic producers and stimulate exports and production (especially of energy intensive products); second, low fuel prices lead to energy waste, hence, higher energy intensity and higher costs. Which effect predominates?
To begin with, it is easy to demonstrate that resource rich countries normally maintain lower level of domestic fuel prices: If the indicator Y99/Area is omitted, EXfuel keeps its significance though lоg(Y75) looses it.
However, low domestic fuel prices lead to higher growth. This negative correlation is in fact visible at the chart below ( fig. 2) , and more accurate calculations provide additional evidencecontrolling for the initial income, the size of the country (population), and the quality of institutions, it turns out that growth rates depend negatively on the level of domestic fuel prices,
i.e. lower prices are associated with higher growth rates: The interpretation of this relationship could be that there probably exists the correlation between different instruments of industrial policy: countries that try to diversify their export and promote growth keep domestic fuel prices low and also support research and development. Low domestic fuel prices allow supporting national producers without resorting to import tariffs -there is a significant positive correlation between the level of fuel prices and import tariffs (R = 0.39).
Low domestic fuel prices and the quality of institutions
In the following regressions we try to put together both sets of explanatory variables -the ones that characterize the quality of institutions and the ones that measure the relative level of domestic fuel prices. We get a number of threshold relationships that generally suggest that fuel exports hinders growth in countries with poor quality of institutions, whereas low level of fuel prices has a stimulating effect on growth irrespective of the quality of institutions: This relationship suggests that with poor institutions (IC < 65.8, close to the threshold were Cyprus, Hungary, Malaysia, Thailand), export of fuel (EXfuel) is associated with lower growth, whereas the lower the level of relative domestic fuel prices, the higher is growth.
To test the robustness of the last equation, we experimented with different control and explanatory variables, such as Inv, the ratio of investment to GDP, human capital; HC, production of fuel per capita; Prodf, instead of export of fuel, EXfuel; corruption perception index, CPI, instead of index of investment climate, IC; ratio of fuel prices to clothing and footwear prices as compared to the same ratio in the US, PF/PCl, instead of PFuel -ratio of national fuel prices to the US fuel price. The resulting equations are reported below -it appears that the relationship is quite robust and explains sometimes up to 90% of all cross-country We were not able to find a good regression equation if RER is added to the right hand side as another explanatory variable together with the ones already mentioned -the RER in this case turns out to be insignificant, even though the sign of the coefficient is "correct" (negative). The explanation could be that the RER even after controlling for the GDP per capita is positively correlated with the quality of the institutions, so it is difficult to distinguish between the impact on growth of these two factors -the quality of institutions and the level of RER. As the chart below suggests (fig. 3) , the RER is higher in countries with the better "residual" quality of institutions (after controlling for the level of income), ICres. 
4. Low RER versus low domestic fuel prices
Undervaluation of RER has the same stimulating effect on growth as the low level of domestic fuel prices, so in a sense these two policies are substitutes: y = -3.58***TRANS + 0.135***Inv -0.00045***Y75 + 0. 0053**Pop + 0.11***IC -0.578*n -0.0136***PFuel -0.0178***RER -4.006 R-squared = 0. 6819, N = 50, It is also important that these two policies are both largely non-selective -they give advantages to most producers. However, both policies are costly. Low domestic fuel prices result in energy waste and stimulate exports of energy intensive products, not high-tech products that usually have very low energy intensity. Undervaluation of RER is usually connected with foreign exchange reserve accumulation that means the waste of resources as well.
If one excludes investment from the last regression then RER loses its significance since RER decrease may require extraction of resources out of the economy (accumulation of FER).
It can be shown that the increase in external trade/GDP ratio was the fastest in countries that underpriced their RER most: Meanwhile, recent research suggests that industrial policy aimed at stimulating hi-tech exports has important externalities for growth (Hausmann, Rodrik, 2003; Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2006; . To put it differently, export of resources and energy intensive goods is not so beneficial for growth as exports of high tech goods. From this point of view, it is better to underprice the exchange rate, not the domestic prices for fuel. However, in practice, as was already shown, most resource abundant countries keep high RER and low domestic fuel prices.
Further research is needed to understand what the best compromise between these two options is.
Conclusions
We were able to show that resource rich countries suffer from several shortcomings that hinder their growth. First, the quality of their institutions is inferior to that in other countries -if a country had a poor institutional capacity to begin with, it is very likely to deteriorate in the future proportionately to the magnitude of resource export/production. Second, resource rich countries suffer from the Dutch disease -overvaluation of the exchange rate that creates obstacles for exports, especially exports of high-tech goods, and hinders growth. To promote growth resource rich countries generally keep domestic fuel prices at low level -this policy really helps to stimulate growth, but at a cost of high energy intensity (that kills part of the growth stimulating effect and diverts resources away from high tech industries). No surprise, resource rich countries have relatively lower quality of human capital. Besides, in resource abundant economies the volatility of growth rates is higher and the chances to develop a stable democratic political regime are lower (Polterovich, Popov, Tonis, 2007) . . Nevertheless, it does not appear that resource rich countries grow less rapidly due to their resource wealth. This is explained by the fact that they pursue good policies in some areas and enjoy the advantages of having resource rent. In particular, resource abundant economies have lower budget deficits and inflation, higher investment/GDP ratios, higher inflows of FDI as compared to GDP, and more equitable distribution of income. So, our analysis supports the thesis of conditional, but not absolute resource curse -resource abundant countries do not grow more slowly than others, but they do lag behind the growth path that could have been possible for them due to their resource wealth.
Whereas it is difficult to improve the quality of institutions in the short run, it is theoretically possible to switch to a more promising industrial policy. Government has to try to attract business for joint projects that would borrow new technologies from the West to increase productivities of main non-resource sectors. One should keep RER low enough to promote high technology export and gradually raise fuel domestic prices to increase efficiency of energy use.
Under weak institutions, government interference is always risky. Up to now, there were no resource abundant countries with this combination of policies. However, this seems to be the only catching up strategy with a reasonable chance for success.
The underperformance of resource rich economies is a relatively recent phenomenon. At the end of the nineteenth century they grew fast so that their average per capita income was higher than that of the average resource poor countries in the early 1960s (Auty, 2001, p.5) . Therefore a hypothesis arises that current underperformance is a result of globalization. It is noteworthy that Norway does not hurry to participate in the European integration processes. It would be very important to reveal which particular globalization channels are responsible for successes and failures of resource abundant countries.
Chang (2002) suggests that globalization may have negative impact on developing countries due to the following reason. When the West was industrializing it was protectionist; it did not protect intellectual property, the Western states were interventionist and regulated banking industry very tightly. Now developing countries are required to decrease the role of the state in their economies, to liberalize trade and the movement of capital, to protect intellectual property rights and environment, to deregulate banking system, etc. If a developing economy follows these strong recommendations, it basically loses instruments of fostering the catch up development. The conclusions of another paper (Polterovich, Popov (2002 ) are very much in line with this general approach: optimal economic policies for countries with low per capita GDP and poor quality of institutions turn out to be different from optimal set of policies for developed countries.
Russian economy suffers from the shortcomings of a rather typical resource country -it has poor institutions, low domestic fuel prices and relatively overvalued RER. The increase in domestic fuel and energy prices together with the lowering of RER seems to be desirable, but has to be gradual, carefully managed and supplemented by other appropriate industrial policies.
